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1 Introduction
Little is known of the efficiency of competition policy. A key reason for this
state of affairs is that important statistics, such as the proportion of industries
(markets) that have a cartel under an existing competition policy regime, or
would have a cartel if there was no competition policy, are unknown.1 These
statistics are unknown because we lack tools to deal with incomplete cartel data.
We develop a model that takes this central feature of cartel data into account
and can be applied to inter-industry panel data as well as time-series data from
a single industry. It allows identification of the central parameters that are
relevant for competition policy, such as the probability of cartel detection by
the Competition Authority (CA) and the probability of applying for leniency,
if such policies are in place. We take the model to data on nationwide Finnish
legal cartels in manufacturing industries from 1951 to 1990 and estimate the
number of cartels in the (from a modern viewpoint counterfactual) state of no
active competition policy.
To illustrate the incompletness of cartel data, consider how data on an illegal
cartel is exposed. The first data point that is exposed is that the cartel exists in
the period in which it is either uncovered by the Competition Authority (CA),
or a member applies for leniency. The CA may then extend its investigation
into the past of the cartel and eventually, either the CA and / or the court(s)
establish the periods in which the cartel has existed. In reality, the cartel may
have existed for longer or shorter. The CA may be able to establish that in some
previous periods the cartel did not exist, or fail to establish existence in a given
period either because of lack of conclusive evidence, or (as is possible in the U.S.
for example), because of a plea bargain. This observation process produces data
on the cartel’s existence for some of the years preceding their exposure. After the
investigation, a new cartel may be created in the industry, and the cycle begins
again.2 Clearly, the data available to a researcher depends on 1) the prevalence
of cartels, 2) the probability of the CA exposing an existing cartel either through
its investigations, or through leniency, and 3) the probability of the CA being
able to establish the cartel’s (non)existence in the time periods prior to exposure.
1The cartels we study in this paper are nation- and therefore also industrywide, covering
all (e.g. regional) markets.
2 As the cartel was abolished in the period it was discovered, the CA cannot learn how
long the cartel would have existed had it not been exposed.
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This data generation and exposure process, once linked to a theoretical (Markov)
model of cartel behavior, maps into a Hidden Markov Model (HMM). A HMM
consists of a hidden process (the industry cartel dynamics in our case) and an
observation process that reveals information on the state of the hidden process
for some periods, but not for others.
HMMs can be adapted to the dynamics of cartel behavior and be tailored
to the specifics of the institutional environment. To show how, we build on two
recent papers (Harrington and Chang 2009, Chang and Harrington 2009, HC
and CH henceforth) that advance the state of the art by building a theoretical
Markov model where cartels may break down. In their model, cartels face
an incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) each period: If the state of the
world is “too good” (demand too high, as in Rotemberg and Saloner 1986),
the constraint is violated and the cartel breaks down. If there was no cartel
in the previous period, the industry gets an opportunity to form a cartel with
positive probability. Success in forming the cartel is subject to the ICC not
being violated. HC incorporate into their model a probability of cartel detection
and CH also a probability of applying for leniency, both of which lead to the
cartel being exposed to the CA. The objective of these papers is to build a
model where cartel births and deaths are endogenized, and to explore how data
on the duration of exposed cartels could allow one to measure the effect of a
policy change on the prevalence of cartels. Building on similar insights, Miller
(2009) independently develops a dynamic (Markov) model of cartel formation
and dissolution and studies, using aggregate data on the number of exposed
U.S. cartels, whether the leniency program that the U.S. Department of Justice
introduced in 1993 reduced cartellization. We map the Markov model of HC
and CH into a HMM.
The modern literature on cartels can be divided into inter-industry studies
and into research focusing on individual cartels in line with the New Empirical
Industrial Organization (NEIO) approach surveyed e.g. by Bresnahan (1989).
Prominent examples of the latter strand of the literature are Porter (1983), Lee
and Porter (1984), Ellison (1994), Pesendorfer (2000), Porter and Zona (1993,
1999), Genesove and Mullin (1998, 2001), Röller and Steen (2006) and Asker
(2009). These papers demonstrate the inner workings of a given cartel and as a
group reveal a considerable amount of heterogeneity, both over industries and
over time, in how cartels operate, how effective they are in sustaining collusive
outcomes and in the welfare losses they generate.
Important precursors to our modeling approach are Porter (1983), Lee and
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Porter (1984) and Ellison (1994) who all study the Joint Executive Commit-
tee, i.e., the railroad cartel for freight shipments from Chicago to the Atlantic
seabord that existed in the 1880s. Porter (1983) and Lee and Porter (1984) al-
low for two hidden states of the industry - collusion or price-war in their set-up
- and utilize an imperfect indicator to identify the actual state of the industry.
Ellison (1994) extends their empirical work by bringing in a Markov structure
for the hidden process. Our HMM allows for a richer state space than was
necessary for these authors. Consequently, we can identify also those structural
parameters of the model that describe modern competition policy (i.e., cartel
detection by the CA and leniency parameters).
Prior to the emergence of NEIO, most cartel research belonged to the inter-
industry approach. For example, Frass and Greer (1977) and Hay and Kelley
(1974) used data on illegal cartels and found that concentration and the num-
ber of “conspirators” is positively correlated with the probability of collusion.
More recently, Symeonidis’ work on cartels (much of which is summarized in
Symeonidis 2002) has made use of the inter-industry variation in policy changes
to identify the treatment effect of cartelization. Other examples include Leven-
stein and Suslow’s (2006b) study of international cartels, Miller’s (2009) paper
on the number of exposed U.S. cartels and Brenner’s (2009) analysis of European
Commission’s leniency program.
While our data is inter-industry, our model offers the possibility of bridging
these strands of the literature, as it is capable of dealing with both longitudinal
inter-industry data as well as time-series data from a single industry. An inter-
industry approach is necessarily less able to account for the heterogeneity in
how cartels work, but it has the benefit of being able to provide answers to the
policy relevant questions raised above. To illustrate how, we take our HMM
model to panel data on 234 Finnish manufacturing industries from 1951 to
1990. Benefits of these data are the length of the observation period and the
fact that all industries operate in the same institutional environment. In 109
of these industries, there was a known nationwide horizontal cartel in existence
some time between 1951 - 1990. For the remaining 125 industries it is unknown
whether a cartel ever existed, and if one did, when and for how long. We
have obtained data on the 109 cartels from the Registry that the government
established in 1958 when the first Finnish competition law was enacted. Such
registries were commonplace in industrialized countries, including e.g. Germany,
Switzerland, the Netherlands, all Nordic countries and Australia. Cartels were
legal during our whole observation period. They ended in the Registry either
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through self-reporting or through the CA approaching them. We have gone
through the Registry folder of each of these 109 cartels in detail and established
those years in which one can be sure that a cartel was alive and active (i.e., the
cartel engaged in correspondence with the Registry) or not in existence (dead).
For some cartels, we can also establish their actual birth and/or death dates.
For the remaining industry-years, we are agnostic about the (hidden) state of
industries and take therefore no stance on them (i.e., such observations are
assigned into state “unknown”).3 We have also collected publicly available data
on industrial statistics for all 234 industries in our sample and matched them
with macroeconomic variables and variables that describe the evolution of the
general workings of the Finnish Cartel Registry.
We use these data to estimate the parameters of the observation process
of the HMM and the associated hidden process that governed the births and
deaths of the manufacturing cartels during an era when there was no active
competition policy. The link to the modern era of illegal cartels is that we
provide an upper bound estimate to the number of cartels - after all, while
legal cartels’ existence is not affected by competition policy, they are subject to
(many of) the same internal incentive problems that illegal cartels face. We can
therefore also answer the question: How cartelized was Finnish manufacturing
in the era of legal cartels? The answer to this question is a key piece in the
evaluation of modern competition policy.
By way of preview, we find that the chance of forming a cartel is around 20%,
increases over our sample period and responds to positive shocks to GDP. The
probability of a cartel continuing is very high (over 90%) and quite stable. Our
estimate of the proportion of manufacturing industries that were in a cartel is
increasing over time, and reaches more than 90% by the end of our observation
period. This is true also in our counterfactual analysis where we remove the large
effects of positive shocks to GDP. To the best of our knowledge, no comparable
estimates exist in the literature. Our results suggest that implementation of
strict competition policy is of first order importance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we first
briefly review the relevant parts of the Harrington and Chang / Chang and
Harrington cartel models. We then show how a HMM that matches the collusive
dynamics of these models with the observed data can be specified. In the third
3Because of the introduction of the “unknown” state, our HMM allows us to circumvent the
problem of right censoring of observed cartel durations which has plagued part of the earlier
literature.
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section, we describe the Finnish institutional environment vis-à-vis cartels after
WWII and how the variant of the HMM that we develop takes it into account.
We then move to a description of the data and key variables, present our results
and discuss their policy implications. Section four concludes.
2 Modeling Cartel Births and Deaths
2.1 The Harrington and Chang model
HC and CH model an industry where (identical) firms in an industry each period
simultaneously decide whether or not to collude and where collusion can be
detected by a CA. From our perspective, the key difference between the papers
is that the latter allows for leniency, while the former does not. Period-specific
profits per firm under collusion are pi; firms earn αpi, α ∈ [0, 1) if they compete;
and a deviating firm earns ηpi, η > 1. The profit measure pi has a continuously
differentiable cdf HIC , upper and lower bounds pi and pi, and an expected value
µ. Firms have an infinite horizon with a common discount factor δ. The CA is
modelled as i) a detection (and prosecution and conviction) probability σ ∈ [0, 1)
and ii) penalty F/(1 − δ) paid by each firm if a cartel is exposed. CH assume
that F = γ(Y − αµ) where Y is the (scaled) continuation payoff from being in
a cartel. Leniency is modeled as follows (for details, see CH):4 Firms have an
incentive to apply for leniency only if their cartel breaks down.5 If just one firm
applies for leniency, it pays a fine θF , where θ ∈ (0, 1), while other firms pay F .
If all firms apply for leniency simultaneously, each firm pays a penalty ωF where
ω ∈ (0, 1). It is important to note that the model does not (explicitly) allow
for tacit collusion, but either the industry has a cartel that is operational, i.e.,
deviates from the competitive outcome (each firm earning pi), or the industry
is competitive (firms earning αpi), or a firm deviates (earning ηpi, other firms
earning zero).
4 CH model in detail the antitrust enforcement technology (see their Section 2.2). We omit
this and several other parts of their modeling as they are not instrumental to our exercise.
5 A colluding firm who is going to apply for leniency at the end of the period would be
better off deviating.
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At the beginning of a period, an industry is either in a cartel or not; this is
dictated by the previous period’s outcome. If the industry is not in a cartel, it
forms a cartel with probability κ ∈ (0, 1). The remaining within-period sequence
of events is the same for cartels thus born, and cartels that existed in the previous
period: Given the realization of pi (which the firms observe prior to deciding on
cartel continuation), the ICC either holds, and the industry colludes, or doesn’t,
in which case the cartel dies. If the industry colludes, the cartel may be exposed
by the CA; this happens with probability σ. It may also be exposed to the CA
if at least one member of a collapsing cartel applies for leniency. In either case,
the cartel is shut down and fines are levied. Finally, exposure (and death) may
not happen, in which case the industry continues in state “cartel” into the next
period. The structural parameters of the model are thus µ, α, η, HIC , κ, δ, σ,
θ, ω and F , the first six describing the industry and the last four the prevailing
antitrust policy.
CH show that the ICC of an industry takes the form
(1− δ)pi + δ[(1− σ)Y + σ(W − F )] ≥ (1− δ)ηα + δ[W −min{σ, θ}F ], (1)
where Y (W ) is the scaled continuation payoff from (not) being in a cartel and
F = γ(Y − αµ). Both are functions of (all of) the structural parameters. The
L.H.S. of the ICC has two parts. The first denotes the current and the second
the expected profits earned if there is collusion: In that case, the cartel is not
exposed with probability (1−σ) and it earns the continuation payoff is Y . With
probability σ the cartel is exposed. Then the continuation payoff is W and the
expected fine F = γ(Y −αµ). On the R.H.S., the first term are the profits from
deviating. Deviating will yield the competitive continuation payoff W , which
is the first component of the second R.H.S. term. A deviating firm will apply
for leniency if the penalty from doing so is less than the expected penalty from
being caught, yielding the last component of the second term on the R.H.S. side
(i.e., min{σ, θ}F ).
HC set out the conditions under which cartels may be born when there is no
leniency, whereas CH derive the same conditions with leniency. In both models,
the expected payoff to being cartelized is defined by a recursion that can be
solved through a fixed point calculation. Using the fixed point with collusion,
Y ∗, and rearranging (1) shows that the ICC can be rewritten in terms of pi:
pi ≤ φ∗ (2)
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where φ∗ = 1(1−δ)(η−1) [
δ(1−σ)(1−κ)(1−δ)(Y ∗−αµ)
1−δ(1−κ) − δ(σ−min{σ, θ}γ(Y
∗−αµ)] on
the R.H.S is a measure of cartel stability. Cartels collapse internally if the profit
shock exceeds φ∗. We denote the probability that this ICC is satisfied by H .
For our purposes, this modelling framework has two important features:
First, it results in a Markov model for the hidden collusive dynamics of an
industry and generates an unobserved sequence of cartel and non-cartel periods.
Second, it incorporates the feature that some cartels are exposed because the
CA detects them or because at least one member of a collapsing cartel applies
for leniency.
2.2 HMM for Cartel Births and Deaths
HMMs provide a means to study dynamic processes that are observed with
noise.6 The evolution of the population of cartels matches this description, be-
cause we typically observe the (collusive) dynamics of an industry only irregu-
larly, if at all, and only for discovered cartels. A HMM consists of an underlying
hidden (“unobserved”) process and an observation process. In particular, the
observed data, Oit , for industry i = 1, ..., N and periods t = 1, ..., Ti follow a
HMM if the hidden states, {Zit}
Ti
t=1, follow a Markov chain and if, given Zit,
observation Oit at time t for i is independent of the past and future of hidden
states and observations (see Appendix A for a more detailed description). In
our case, the hidden process is the state of the industry and the observation
process is what the researcher knows about the state of the industry in a given
period. The dimension of the state space of the hidden process is typically either
assumed or estimated. In our case, it follows directly from economic theory and
the institutional environment.
6 Our model belongs to the class of finite Hidden Markov Models (e.g., Cappé, Moulines
and Rydén 2005, pp. 6). HMMs are not very widely used in economics. There have been some
applications in macroeconomics (and time-series analysis), where they are known as Markov
switching models (see, e.g., Hamilton 1989, and Engle and Hamilton 1990). Other examples
include Bhar and Hamori (2004) and Wang and Alba (2006).
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2.2.1 Hidden Process for Cartel Births and Deaths
Consider cartel births and deaths in some industry i at time t > 1. At the
beginning of period t the industry is either in a cartel or not. Being in a
cartel is here synonymous with actually colluding (i.e., the market outcome not
being competitive).7 If the industry is not in a cartel, a cartel is formed with
probability κit. Conditional on the opportunity, the cartel is stable and becomes
operational with probability Hit. This probability is directly linked to the ICC
(2) discussed above. If the industry is in a cartel at the beginning of period t,
then it stays alive with probability Hit. With probability 1−Hit, an existing
cartel breaks down during period t.
There is a CA that constantly monitors the status of each industry. At the
end of period t, the state of industry i is detected by the CA with probability
σit. If the industry is in a cartel, the cartel is shut down immediately (and fines
are levied). If the industry is not in a cartel, the industry stays as is. Besides
the CA, there is a corporate leniency program in place. Conditional on the
cartel breaking up, the probability that it will be exposed to the CA because of
a leniency application is νit.
This process for cartel births and deaths means that at the end of period t,
industry i is either not in a cartel (“n”), is in an on-going cartel (“c”), has been
detected and shut down by the CA (“d”) or has after the break up been exposed
to the CA because of a leniency application (“ l”). Treating these four outcomes
as the states of hidden process for Zit, its state space is SZ = (n, c, d, l). The
associated transition matrix Ait is


(1− κit) + κit(1−Hit)(1− νit) κitHit(1− σit) κitHitσit κit(1 −Hit)νit
(1−Hit)(1− νit) H(1− σit) Hitσit (1−Hit)νit
(1− κit) + κit(1−Hit)(1− νit) κitHit(1− σit) κitHitσit κit(1 −Hit)νit
(1− κit) + κit(1−Hit)(1− νit) κitHit(1− σit) κitHitσit κit(1 −Hit)νit

 .
(3)
Besides the fact that the rows of the matrix sum to one, there are three
features that we should emphasize about the transition matrix:
7 In other words, a “price war” would be classified as a period of no cartel. This is in line
with the HC model where the deviation by one firm leads to the cartel collapsing and the
industry entering the next period in state “no cartel”.
8
First, the elements of the matrix are the transition probabilities of a first-
oder Markov chain. The cell in the upper left-corner, for example, gives P (Zit =
n|Zi,t−1 = n)=(1−κit)+κit(1−Hit)(1− νit) =1+κit (Hit(1− νit) + νit). It is
derived as follows: If an industry is not in a cartel at t−1, then with probability
(1−κit) there is no opportunity to form a cartel. If there is an opportunity, the
newly born cartel may turn out to be unstable, but the member firms do not
apply for leniency. The probability of this event is κit(1 − Hit)(1 − νit). The
probability given in the upper left-corner cell is the sum of the probabilities of
these two events.
Second, the detection probability σit shows up only in columns 2 and 3
because the detection activities of the CA affect only those states in which an
industry is in a cartel at the beginning of period t. The cell in the first row
of the third column, for example, gives the probability for the event that an
industry that has not been in a cartel at t− 1 forms a cartel during period t but
is immediately detected and shut down by the CA.
Third, the first and two last rows are equal, because we assume that if an
industry has at t− 1 been in a cartel that has been exposed to the CA, it does
not affect the process that leads to the creation of new cartels in subsequent
periods. This assumption could be relaxed at the cost of additional complexity.
To complete our specification of the hidden process for cartel births and
deaths, let the R.H.S. of (2) vary over industries and time and rewrite the
inequality by substracting from both sides the mean of the expected profits
under collusion in industry i during period t (µit). This leaves a demeaned
profit shock, piit − µit, to the L.H.S. of the inequality, now taking the form of
a discrete choice equation with a particular structure on the R.H.S. With Hit
denoting the probability that the inequality holds for industry i in period t, we
have
Hit = HICDM (φ
∗
it − µit) (4)
where HICDM (•) refers to the c.d.f. of the demeaned profit shock. We can
think of φ∗it − µit as a function of observable characteristics (which could enter,
e.g., through µit) and the structural parameters of the model.
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2.2.2 Observed Data and the Observation Process
In modern data sets on discovered cartels (see, e.g., Miller 2009, Brenner 2009,
Levenstein Suslow 2006a,b), the observed data, Oit, for industry i at time t vary
but are becoming increasingly detailed. For some industries in these data sets,
the state of the industry can be determined for certain periods from the records
and publications of the CA and the courts. For some (but clearly not for all)
industries, these records allow one to infer, for example, whether industry i was
or was not in an on-going (operational) cartel in a given period. Specifically,
the records may show whether the industry has been subjected to a competition
policy action (i.e., whether a cartel has been detected by the CA or whether it
was exposed because some, perhaps unidentified members applied for leniency).
For the remaining industry-period observations in the data, the state of the
industry cannot be determined at all, or perhaps not with any acceptable level of
confidence. In particular, for a number of industries, the status of the industry
cannot be determined for any period. A prime example of such a case is an
industry that has never been investigated or convicted for having a cartel.8
There are three important ways in which the records and publications of the
CA and courts may be incomplete. First, information about the status of an
industry beyond the detection is typically available only for the cartels detected
by the CA or for those cartels that were exposed to the authorities because
of a leniency application. Second, even for the exposed cartels, the status of
the industry may be determined for some periods only. Third, the (published)
records of the authorities do not cover all industries and thus cannot provide
information about the unrecorded industries’ states.
The foregoing suggests that in each period t, either the state of industry i is
not known (“u”), or the industry is observed not to be in a cartel (“n”), to be
in an on-going cartel (“c”), to have been been detected and shut down by the
CA (“d”) or to have been exposed to the CA because of a leniency application
(“l”). These five observed cartel outcomes give the state space of the observation
process, SO = (n, c, d, l, u).
HMMs model such observed data by linking it to the hidden process that
govern the formation and dissolution of cartels. When the unobserved state
of industry i at time t is k ∈ SZ = (n, c, d, l), a HMM postulates that the
probability of observing w ∈ SO = (n, c, d, l, u) is
8See Appendix B for a clarifying example.
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bkit(w) = P (Oit = w|Zit = k) (5)
To derive the observation probabilities explicitly and to match them to a
modern competition policy environment, we make the following assumptions:
First, we assume that if an industry is not in a cartel, its (true) state is
observed in the data available to the reseacher with probability bnit(n) = β
n
it.
If this event happens, Oit = Zit = n. With the complementary probability
bnit(u) = 1−β
n
it, the state cannot be determined realiably and remains unknown.
If this event happens, Oit = u and Zit = n. If an industry is in a cartel, its
(true) state is observed in the data with probability bcit(c) = β
c
it. In this case,
Oit = Zit = c. Again, with the complementary probability, the status remains
unknown. This implies that Oit = u and Zit = c.
This formulation of the observation process relies on the assumption that
if an industry is (is not) in a cartel, the observed data never wrongly suggest
that it is not (is). This assumption imposes bnit(c) = b
c
it(n) = 0 and implies
that there are no mistakes in the records and publications of the CA and the
courts. We stress that this restriction may sound stronger than it is, because if
and when one has reasons to suspect that there are such errors, the status of an
industry can be labelled “unknown”. Moreover, this assumption can be relaxed
if the data contain information about potential mistakes or mislabelings in the
records.9
The second assumption that we make to derive the observation probabilities
is that the exposure of a cartel to the CA is observed (by the researcher) with
probability one. Formally, we impose bkit(n) = b
k
it(c) = b
k
it(u) = 0 for k = d, l
together with bdit(d) = b
l
it(l) = 1. We think that it also is plausible to assume
that the observed data never suggest (to the researcher) that a cartel has been
shut down by the CA or exposed because of leniency when it really was not
(i.e., bnit(d) = b
c
it(d) = b
l
it(d) = 0 and b
n
it(l) = b
c
it(l) = b
d
it(l) = 0).
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The estimates of βitc and β
it
n reflect the ability of the CA (and courts) to
determine, in an ex post investigation, whether a detected cartel did or did not
exist in the periods prior to the detection. They are therefore potentially policy
9Porter (1983), Lee and Porter (1984) and Ellison (1994) allow for mistakes in the obser-
vation process, but do not have the observation state “unknown”.
10 If, for some reason, there is uncertainty about the cause of exposure, the model can be
extended to allow for such an observation process. One way to do so is to let bl
it
(l) = βl
it
with
bl
it
(d) = 1− βl
it
and bd
it
(d) = βd
it
with bd
it
(l) = 1− βd
it
.
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relevant.
2.2.3 HMM Representation
Assuming an initial distribution for Zi1 (i.e. the probability that unit i is at the
unobserved state k ∈ SZ in the initial period),
τki = P (Zi1 = k) (6)
and combining the hidden process for cartel births and deaths with the obser-
vation process results in the following HMM representation for industry i:
Zi = Zi1, Zi2, ..., ZiTi
Oi = Oi1, Oi2, ..., OiTi (7)
SZ = (n, c, d, l)
SO = (n, c, d, l, u)
where Zi is the vector of the actual states of industry i that take values from
the state space SZ and Oi is the vector of observed states for industry i that
take values from the observation state space SO. The remaining elements of
the HMM are transition probabilities Ait =
[
ajkit
]
given in equation (3) and
observation probabilities
Bit =
[
bkit(w)
]
=


βnit 0 0 0 1− β
n
it
0 βcit 0 0 1− β
c
it
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0

 . (8)
To derive the likelihood of the HMM, let Θ denote the model parameters,
Di1 a (5× 1) vector with elements d
k
i1(w) = τ
k
i b
k
i1(w), Dit a (5× 5) matrix with
elements djkit (w) = a
jk
it b
k
it(w) for t > 1, and 1 a (5× 1) vector of ones. As shown
in e.g. MacDonald and Zucchini (2009, p. 37), Altman (2007) and Zucchini,
Raubenheimer and MacDonald (2008), the likelihood for the whole observed
data can be written as
L(Θ;o) =
N∏
i=1
{
(Di1)
′
(
Ti∏
t=2
Dit
)
1
}
(9)
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where o denotes the data (the realization ofO).11 To maximize L(Θ;o), (direct)
numerical maximization methods can be used (MacDonald and Zucchini 2009,
Chapter 3; Turner 2008). Typically, a normalization (scaling) is used to avoid
numerical underflow.12
The HMM summarized above can be extended to allow for unobserved het-
erogeneity (see e.g. Altman 2007). To bring in unobserved heterogeneity prop-
erly into our HMM would however require modeling it within the theoretical
model. We proceed without allowing for unobserved heterogeneity.
2.2.4 Estimation
Because {τni , κit, Hit, σit, νit, β
n
it, β
c
it} are all probabilities, a simple way to
parametrize them is to assume a standard probability model for each of them.
This can mean, for example, that one imposes κit= Φ(κ
′xit), where Φ(•) is the
c.d.f. of the normal distribution, xit denotes the available explanatory variables
and κ is the parameter vector to be estimated. We adopt this approarch in our
empirical application.
The identification of (the parameters of) a general finite HMM follows from
the identifiability of mixture densities (see Cappé, Moulines and Rydén 2005, pp.
450-457). The parameters of our HMM for cartel births and deaths are identified
for further two reasons: First, we impose theoretical restrictions upon the hidden
process describing the formation and dissolution of cartels. These restrictions
allow us to circumvent the problem of identifying the dimension of the hidden
process: The theoretical model and the institutional environment (e.g. the
existence of a corporate leniency facility) directly suggest that SO = (n, c, d, l),
which implies that the dimension is four.13 A second source of identification are
11 Picking the appropriate elements fromAit andBit, we can determine d
jk
it
(w) = ajk
it
bkit(w)
for t > 1, i.e., the elements of matrix D
it
of the likelihood function that is given as equation
(9). If, for example, oit = c, the upper left-corner cell of Dit is d
nn
it
(w) = ann
it
bn
it
(c) = 0.
For t = 1, the elements of the vector Di1, dkit = τ
k
i
bk
i1
(w), in the likelihood function can be
determined similarly.
12 It is a well-known property of (9) that even for a short time period, the individual
elements of the vector of probabilities (held at a given stage of the maximization algorithm)
often become indistinguishable from zero.
13 For a general discussion of identification, see Cappe Moulines, and Rydén (2005, ch. 15).
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the parameter restrictions that we impose on Bit.
An intuitive way to think about the identification of our HMM is that we
have only 4+2 probabilities that call for identification, but a greater number of
moments (transitions) that identify them. The observed transitions from c to c
and c to n identify Hit, whereas the observed transitions from n to c and n to
n identify κit. Transitions from and to d and from and to l allows us to identify
σit and νit. Finally, differences in the transition rates from c to c and c to n
and from n to n and n to c identify βnit and β
c
it.
Estimation of the parameters of Hit, as given by (4), deserves a further
comment. One way to proceed is to estimate a reduced form of this probabil-
ity. This is computationally simpler, but has the downside of not enabling a
counterfactual analysis of different competition policy regimes. The reason for
this is that the effects of the competition policy parameters σit and νit on Hit
are not identified. The other possibility is to estimate Hit structurally, but this
requires that the fixed point with collusion (Y ∗) and the associated threshold
(φ∗) are computed. The estimation routine could be e.g. a nested fixed point
algorithm where one starts from some initial values for the estimated parame-
ters, calculates the fixed point (i.e., the value of φ∗), proceeds to re-estimate the
structural parameters by Maximum Likelihood, and continues until convergence
is achieved.14 Alternatively, the recently introduced MPEC algorithm could be
utilized (Judd and Su 2008).
2.2.5 State Prediction
A convenient feature of HMMs is that the hidden states of the underlying
Markov model can be analyzed in a relatively straightforward way (see Ap-
pendix C for a more detailed description of some of these methods). For us, it
suffices to note that the HMM allows for period-by-period inference about the
state of the Markov chain that is most likely to have given rise to the observed
data for a given industry in a given period t. This procedure is called ’local
14 Natural candidates for initial values would be the parameter estimates from a model
where Hit has been modelled in reduced form. An issue one would have to solve is how to
deal with the potential multiplicity of Y ∗. See CH for a discussion of multiple equilibria in
their model.
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decoding’. In a cartel application, this feature means that one can, for exam-
ple, deduce the likelihood for the existence of a cartel in a given industry for
those periods for which the observed data are not directly informative about
the state of that industry. We will apply this method to answer the question
of how the cartelization of the Finnish manufacturing industries evolved within
our observation period.
3 Finnish Legal Cartels
3.1 Modelling Finnish Legal Cartels
3.1.1 The Institutional Environment and the Cartel Registry
The Finnish institutional environment vis-á-vis cartels mirrors wider European
and especially Swedish developments both before and after WWII. Before the
war, and until 1958, there was no competition law. The apparent reason was
that the then prevailing liberal view held that contractual freedom entailed also
the right to form cartels (see Fellman 2009). We have chosen to focus on the
developments after 1950, because the Finnish economy was heavily regulated
during WWII and because those regulations were mostly lifted by 1950.
Finnish steps towards a legal framework for competition policy started soon
after WWII as in 1948, a government committee was set to provide a frame-
work for competition legislation. The ensuing legislation (the 1958 law) was
built around the idea of making cartels public through registration. Registra-
tion, however, was to be done solely on authorities’ request. Only tender (pro-
curement) cartels became illegal, and even these were apparently not effectively
barred from operation (Purasjoki and Jokinen 2001). Vertical price fixing could
be banned if deemed “particularly harmful”. The law embodied the prevailing
thinking of cartels not (necessarily) being harmful. A Finnish CA was set up to
register the cartels. Here Finland followed Norway and Sweden, which set up
similar registers in 1926 and 1946.
The CA was active, sending out 9750 enquiries by 1962, and registering 243
cartels (Fellman 2009, pp. 17). However, the fact that registration was depen-
dent on authorities’ activism was an issue. To tackle this, the law was revised
and the new law took effect in 1964. The main new feature was compulsory
notification by those cartels that established formal bodies such as associations.
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Cartels purely based on agreements between firms without formal organizations
were still exempt from compulsory registration. The law was again revised in
1973. The single largest change appears to have been that the obligation to
register was again widened. Finland finally edged towards modern competition
law with a committee that started its work in 1985. On the basis of this work,
a new law took effect in 1988. This law gave the newly established Finnish
Competition Authority (new FCA) the right to abolish agreements that were
deemed harmful. The law also abolished cartel agreements’ status as legally
binding contracts. The new FCA initiated a negotiation round with cartels
where these were asked to provide reasons why they should be allowed to con-
tinue. In 1992 the law was again changed (and took effect Januar 1st 1993):
Now cartels became illegal. Some exceptions were however allowed.
The former and current Director Generals of the Finnish CA (Purasjoki
and Jokinen, 2001) sum up the environment prior to the 1988 law as follows:
“Time was such that there seemed no need to intervene even in clear-cut cases,
especially if they had been registered. Registration had been transformed into
a sign of acceptability of the [cartel] agreement, at least for the parties involved
[in the cartel]”. Based on this, we end our analysis to 1990.
For each cartel in the Registry, there is a folder containing the entire corre-
spondence between the Registry and the cartel (members). For many cartels,
the cartel contract is also available (as it was requested by the Registry). This
correspondence allows one in most cases to establish e.g. who took the initiative
that led to a registration, or a change in it. As we explain below, this informa-
tion allows one to pin down the actual birth and/or death dates of some cartels
and/or their existence (or non-existence) in certain industries and years.
Over the period of its existence the Finnish Cartel Registry registered as
many as 900 cartels. For each cartel, the Registry assigned a 4-digit ISIC
code. We concentrate on manufacturing industries and particularly on the 109
industry-wide manufacturing cartels that are found in the Registry. The total
number of ISIC-4 manufacturing industries is 234, and we follow these industries
over 40 years from 1951 to 1990.
3.1.2 HMM for Legal Cartels
The institutional context that has generated our cartel data can be modelled
using a nested version of the HMM for cartel births and deaths developed above.
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Due to cartels being legal, the Finnish CA did not attempt to close cartels over
the period 1951-1990, nor was there a leniency program in place. These features
of the data can be captured by imposing σit = 0 and νit = 0 for all t and i. This
restriction reduces the state space of the hidden process to SZ = (n, c) and the
dimension of the observation process to SO = (n, c, u), because the state of an
industry can never be d (i.e., no cartel was ever shut down by the Finnish CA)
or l (if a cartel broke down, it never resulted in a leniency application).
Taking into account these modifications, noting that the panel of Finnish
legal cartels is balanced and assuming constant initial probabilities of having a
cartel (τki =τ
k for t = 1), results in a “legal-era” HMM with N = 234, T = 40
and with transition probabilities
Ait =
[
annit a
nc
it
acnit a
cc
it
]
=
[
(1 − κitHit) κitHit
(1−Hit) Hit
]
(10)
and observation probabilities
Bit =
[
bnit(n) b
n
it(c) b
n
it(u)
bcit(n) b
c
it(c) b
c
it(u)
]
=
[
βnit 0 1− β
n
it
0 βcit 1− β
c
it
]
. (11)
Despite the reduction of the state spaces, the interpretation of the HMM
and its various components does not change, except that Hit no longer depends
on σit or νit. The interpretation of β
n
it and β
c
it nevertheless deserves a comment,
as they now reflect the ability of the Finnish CA to identify and keep record of
cartelized industries during the era when cartels were legal in Finland. Because
βnit≤ 1 and β
c
it≤ 1, the model explictly allows for the possibility that there are
holes in the Registry and thus that the state is unknown for some industry-
years in the data. There are two primary reasons for this incompleteness: First,
information about the state of a registered cartel can be incomplete over time.
It is, for example, possible that the cartel did not reply to the inquires by the
CA about its status. On the other hand, some cartelized industries were never
registered and some industries may not have had cartels.15 For these cases, our
data conservatively assign state u, as we explain in greater detail below.
15 Purasjoki and Jokinen (2001) mention a few cartels that were not registered, but they
do not explain how these cartels were exposed (apart from them being exposed as part of the
negotiation initiative set up by the new FCA in the late 1980s). This neverteless confirms
that the Registry was not complete.
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3.2 Data Sources and Description
Our data come from two main sources, Statistics Finland and the Finnish Car-
tel Registry. The former provides us with macroeconomic data and 2-digit
ISIC level industrial statistics that we match to the 234 4-digit manufactur-
ing industries in our sample.16 The latter allows us to identify 109 nationwide
manufacturing cartels and is our sole source of cartel data.
3.2.1 The Definition of States and Observed Transitions
For each of the 109 manufacturing cartels in the Registry, we have been through
their entire folder using a “semi-structured” approach.17 For all these cartels we
know when they entered and exited the Registry. Several cartels were born prior
to the Registry being established, and some cartels did not register immediately
at the time of birth (of either the cartel or the Registry), but some years later.
Correspondingly, we have cartels that died but whose death was not found out
until some years after their death. To improve our data we therefore used
additional Registry information on these cartels where available to establish
actual birth and death dates. The Registry also allows us to date changes
made to cartel contracts or in the organization of cartels. These events yield
information on the cartel being alive. We use all this information to define the
states of the observation process for a given industry in a given year.
To be more precise, the Registry contains information on seven types of
events that the registered cartels (may) have experienced between 1951-1990.
First, we know for all the cartels when they entered the Registry (‘register birth’
16 We use 2-digit ISIC data because of difficulties in tracking industries across three changes
in the 4-digit industry definitions that take place during our observation period. As the data
was not available in electronic form, we collected data for every 4th years and interpolated
the values in between.
17 After initial discussions on what it is that we want to record, we randomly chose 8
cartels and had 4 researchers (including two of us) go independently through the material to
establish whether the information we sought was available, and if, how to record it. We then
checked the 4 individuals’ records against each other, and decided on a common approach
and interpretation of e.g. various wordings that we encountered. We then followed a written
protocol in collecting the information.
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- trb). In addition, we know the date when they exited the Registry for 92 cartels
(‘register death’ - trd). The Registry also has information on different occasions
when the cartels made changes in their cartel contracts (‘contract change’ - tcc),
such as an addition or a deletion of members. There can be many events like
that per cartel over the years. From the additional archive information that
we were able to collect, 71 cartels’ actual birth (‘birth’ - tb) can be established,
and for 76 cartels we know the actual death date (‘death’ - td). In addition,
there were incidences where a cartel was observed to be operational prior to the
registered birth (‘actually alive’ - taa) and also some incidences where we found
proof of the cartel being still alive after their registered birth and before their
(registered) death (‘still alive’ - tsa).
We use these seven types of events to define what the observed state of indus-
try i was in year t. The observation state space is SO = (n, c, u) and we assign
all industry-year observations into one of these three states. How we do this is
illustrated in Figure 1. It is important to keep in mind that our interpretation of
state c is (in line with HC) that not only was there a cartel agreement in place,
but also that the cartel was active in the sense that the firms were trying to
avoid the fully competitive market outcome. Similarly, state n is interpreted to
mean that the industry was competing. Any observations for which we cannot
give such an interpretation are assigned into state u. Importantly, this means
that if an industry does not show up in the Registry at all, all observations for
it are assigned into u.
[Figure 1 – Timeline for state-definition and observed cartel incidences here]
Cartels for whom we observe the actual birth date tb or for whom we have
information on the cartel being actually alive some year prior to register birth
(taa) are assumed to be alive between tb (taa) and the date of register birth
(trb). Correspondingly, cartels for whom we know the actual death date (td)
are presumed to be dead between td and the date of register death (trd). In
addition, cartels are assumed to be alive every year where we either observe a
‘still alive’ incidence or a ‘contract change’ incidence. Cartels are also assumed
to be alive the year before their actual death, when such can be established.
Finally, cartels are assumed dead the period prior to actual birth. For all the
other periods, the state of the observation process is u (unobserved).
The definition of the observed states is in our view quite conservative. For
instance, even though the Registry effectively assumed that the cartels were
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alive between trb and td , we only assign an industry into state c when an event
like tsa or tcc appears. The reason for including the period between tb/taa and
trb as observed c-states is due to the assumption that when a cartel is asked
to register (at trb), it had no reason to tell any other birth date but the latest.
Correspondingly, when the Registry finds out that the cartel is dead (trd), there
is no incentive for the cartel not to inform the Registry of an actual restart
between trb and trd when they are confirming their death to the Registry. This
motivates recording the periods between these incidences as state n. Note also
that the way in which we define observed/unobserved states here removes the
usual problem of right censoring for cartels where we do not know the ending
date, since all cartels that apparently lived when the Registry ended in 1990 are
coded as u after their last tsa/tcc incidence.
Based on this coding we end up with 939 (industry-year) observations where
we know the actual status of the cartel. For 365 of these, we know the industry
is not in a cartel (n-states) and for 574 we can establish the existence of a cartel
(c-states). For the remaining 8421 observations the status of the industries is
unobserved. Thus in the sample where all industries are included, we assing n
or c for 10% of the observations. If we disregard the 125 industries where no
cartels are registered, we have 5000 (125×40) fewer u observations.
3.2.2 Data Description
In the prior literature, register data are often assumed to be roughly in line
with the underlying true distribution of cartel births and deaths. Clearly this
is not the case in our data. During the first few years of the Registry, several
cartels that were born earlier entered the Registry. Correspondingly, exit from
the Registry is very often later than the actual death. If we look at the aver-
age differences, the representative cartel was born 3.6 years earlier than it was
registered and died 2.6 years earlier than it exited the Registry. This suggests
that cartel duration is biased downward when using entries into and exits from
cartel registers as indicators of cartel durability.
From the Registry data we observe few cartels lasting more than 20 years;
cartels lasting between 4-6 and 16-20 years are the most common. We also find
that if the dates of entries into and exits from the Registry were used, we would
find too few short lived cartels (1-3 years) due to late registration of cartel
deaths. The real numbers suggest that the modal cartel lives for 4-6 years.
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Levenstein and Suslow’s (2006b, Figure 1) analysis of 72 illegal international
cartels reveals also that the most common duration of cartels is 4-6 years. It is
interesting that our legal cartel survival distribution (real) is in line with what
they found for illegal cartels.
[Figure 2 – Density on real survival, Registry survival here]
Turning to the estimated density of register-based duration, displayed in
Figure 2, we find it to be skewed to the left, with more of the probability mass
in the interval 5-25 years. Furthermore, the density displays two clear humps.
Looking at the density of the actual duration we find that the hump in the
density around years 16-20 disappears. The median for the real duration is 10
years, whereas the median based on register durations is 11 years. The averages
mirror the overall skewness with an average duration of 13 (12) years using the
real (Registry) numbers.
Our cartels are thus of somewhat longer duration than what others have
found (Levenstein and Suslow, 2006a, Table 1 and 2006b). However, most of
these papers are studying illegal cartels. The closest study to ours is Jacquemin,
Nambu and Dewez (1981) who, studying legal Japanese export cartels, find an
average duration of 10 years.18
The variation in cartel status over time is shown in Figure 3. Typically we
have more cartel observations (c-states) during the first 15 years of the Registry’s
existence, with a peak in 1959. In this period we have few “no cartel” observa-
tions (n-states). During the early eighties the annual share of n observations is
double the share of c observations.
[Figure 3 – n,c,u development here]
[Table 1 – Observed transitions here]
18 It is also interesting to look at how the duration of cartels changes over the sample period.
For the cartels that were born prior to 1966 (half of the subsample of 52) the average real
duration was 18.8 years as compared to a Registry duration of 15.6. Cartels that were born
later than this had average durations of 7.2 and 8.6 years.
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In Table 1 we show the transitions from period t− 1 to period t that follow
from our definitions of the three states. The difference between considering
the cartelized industries only and all the industries is that in the latter case, we
observe a lot more transitions from u to u. For those industries with a registered
cartel, 78% of the observations are transitions from u to u whereas in the whole
data, the proportion is 90%. Adding the industries that do not have an exposed
cartel obviously yield no more information on transitions from state n to c or
vice versa, but crucially, do affect the cell probabilities.
3.2.3 Explanatory Variables
Workings of the Registry
It seems plausible that the ability of the Registry to detect the births and
deaths of cartels improved or at least varied over time. To accommodate this,
we make the two observation probabilities (βcit and β
n
it ) each a function of two
variables: First, we let βcit (β
n
it ) vary with the number of cartels that entered
(exited) the Registry in year t−2. Second, we allow βcit (β
n
it ) be a function of the
(once) lagged cumulative number of registered births (deaths). These variables
are denoted (Birth − flow, Birth − stock,Death− flow,Death− stock) and
they are computed using the data from the whole Registry with 900 cartels.
Their time series variation is shown in Figure 4.
[Figure 4 – Birth and death flow and stock here]
It is interesting to note that even though there is a weak negative trend in
the number of annually registered cartels, there is also a lot of variation over
time. There is an upward trend in the number of Registry deaths.
Macroeconomic Demand Fluctuations
There is a large cartel literature focusing on the importance of demand
and business cycle fluctuations for cartels. Most notable are Green and Porter
(1984), whose model suggests that price wars will arise in response to unobserved
negative demand shocks, and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), whose model pre-
dicts price wars during booms (later discussed by e.g. Haltiwanger and Har-
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rington 1991).19 Levenstein and Suslow (2006a) summarize this literature and
suggest that it is not obvious how cartel survival relates to fluctuations in de-
mand. Of the more than 50 studies and 19 cartels summarized in their Table
1, 6 were formed during downturns, whereas 10 were not. The literature sug-
gests that cartel formation may be linked to the growth trend as well as to
idiosyncratic changes in demand not anticipated by the cartel.20
We have a long panel with 40 years of data over a period in which the Finnish
macroeconomy went through large changes. This makes our dataset particularly
useful for studying whether cartel behavior is affected by business cycle changes.
To account for this, we include several macroeconomic variables into the HMM.
We detrend the Finnish GDP over the 40 years period using the Hodrick and
Prescott filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997), decomposing GDP into the long run
growth trend (HP −trend) and deviations from the long run trend.21 We follow
Levenstein and Suslow (2006b) and decompose the deviations into two variables,
one capturing positive deviations from the long run trend (GDP − pos), and
one capturing all negative deviations from the long run trend (GDP − neg).22
How these three variables and the Finnish GDP evolve over our sample period
can be seen from Figure 5. The positive GDP shocks in e.g. early 1970s and
late 1980s are especially worth pointing out.
[Figure 5 – Graph of GDP, HP-trend, GDP-neg, GDP-pos here]
19 Of course, in these models the cartel is shown to exist under certain conditions, and the
price wars are part of the equilibrium path of the cartel. It is not clear how to relate periods
of active collusion and periods of punishment to the births and deaths of cartels.
20 Some examples of empirical studies include Jacquemin, Nambu and Dewez (1981), Suslow
(2005) and Levenstein and Suslow (2006b).
21 We apply annual GDP volume data and generate the HP-trend and the deviation using
a smoothing index of 100.
22 Note that both variables are defined in absolute terms.
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Industry Characteristics
Several authors have focused on the importance of industry characteristics
when explaining cartel formation (see Levenstein and Suslow 2006a, for a sur-
vey). Slade (1989, 1990) suggests, for example, that price wars can arise from
changes in industry characteristics. Cartel members’ knowledge of fundamental
structural parameters may be incomplete, and industry specific shocks (e.g.,
negative sales shocks) will change the equilibrium prices. We therefore include
the gross value of production over time (GV P ), as measured at the level of
2-digit industries. Even though the gross value of production is correlated with
GDP over time at the macroeconomic level, there is large of variation across
industries.
Among others, Bradburd and Over (1982) argue that organizational costs of
both cartel formation and maintenance are expected to increase with the number
of firms in an industry. We do not have an ideal measure for the number, but can
nevertheless include the number of plants, as measured at 2-digit level (Plants).
There is a lot of variation in this variable across industries, but in the aggregate
there is no clear trend in it over time.
We include the ratio of rawmaterial expenses to the gross value of production
(Materialshare) as a measure of (average) variable costs of production. The ra-
tio of blue collar working hours to the gross value of production (Hours/GV P )
is a measure of (the inverse of) labor productivity. All our covariates are sum-
marized in Table 2.
[Table 2 - Descriptive statistics here]
3.3 Estimation Results
We parameterize the probabilities of our legal era HMM as single index
functions of the explanatory variables described above, using the c.d.f. of the
standard normal distribution. Given that the policy parameters that enter the
ICC are zero in our data (due to cartels being legal), the gain from estimating
Hit structurally is very minor. We therefore estimate a reduced form of it. The
HMM is estimated with ML, using the likelihood function (9).
We present two sets of estimation results in Tables 3-5: In the first set, we
fix the initial probability (the probability of being in a cartel in period t = 1)
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to 0.5; in the second, we estimate it. In column 1 we report the results from
a model without covariates (Model 1, M1); in column 2 those from a model
with only macro variables (Model 2, M2); and in column 3 results from a model
where industry characteristics have been added (Model 3, M3).
[Table 3-5 - Estimation results here]
Starting from a specification test, we can reject the null hypotheses that
the coefficients of the covariates are jointly zero in models that use fixed and
estimated τn. Focusing then on Hit (Table 3), we find the trend in GDP (HP −
trend ) has a positive and signicant effect on the probability of the ICC holding.
All the other variables obtain insignificant coefficients. The trend in GDP has
a positive and significant effect also on the probability of forming a cartel (κit),
with a much larger value in the ICC equation. In addition, positive shocks to
GDP affect cartel formation positively. Blue collar hours/gross value added, our
(inverse) measure of labor productivity (see Table 4), has a negative impact on
κit, suggesting that industries with a higher labor productivity are more likely
to form a cartel. Our measure of variable costs of production, material share,
has a negative effect on the probability of forming a cartel.
While the estimated observation probabilities (i.e., βcit and β
n
it, Table 5)
are of no contemporary policy interest, let us note a few things about them.
The probability of observing a cartel is decreasing both in the flow and in the
stock of registered cartels, suggesting no (positive) learning. In contrast, the
probability of observing a non-cartelized industry in a given year is increasing
in the cumulative number of registered exits and decreasing in the number of
exits registered in year t− 2. Note also that because of the negative (positive)
coefficient for the stock variables, the probability of observing that an industry
does (not) have a cartel is decreasing (increasing) over time. This is in line with
the empirical frequency displayed in Figure 3, suggesting that these parameters
succeed in capturing the behavior of the Registry.
The results are rather similar when we fix the initial probability and when
we estimate τn. However, we do reject the null hypothesis of τn = 0.5. The
estimated initial probability of not being in a cartel is 94%. This high probability
may be explained by the fact that in 1951, the very strict war-time regulations
that had been in place more or less since end of 1939 had only recently been
lifted.
To further probe the robustness of our results, we have done the following.
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First, our model necessitates the use of data on all industries, also those where
the observation process always yields u. To compare our results to most of the
existing work that only uses data on industries that have had an exposed cartel,
we have re-estimated our HMM using data only on the industries with a known
(= registered) cartel during the sample period. The results, omitted for brevity
but available upon request, are very much in line with those of Table 3 - 5.
This suggests that in our case, not using data on industries which do not have a
known cartel would not bias the results greatly. Whether this extends to other
data sets is naturally an open question.
Second, we checked whether our results are sensitive to HP − trend entering
linearly our specifications. A problem with using higher order terms is that they
are very highly correlated (>0.9) with HP − trend. We therefore experimented
by adding the square of the actual GDP series. We found no material changes
to the reported results.
3.4 Policy Implications
Given that our data is from an era of legal cartels, we cannot identify the
policy parameters σit and νit, or their effects on cartel stability. We can however
identify the probability of forming a cartel (κit) and the probability that the
ICC (Hit) holds. These are reported in Table 6 for the various models. We
find that on average, κit is round 0.2. Recalling that we always reject Model 1
against Model 2 against Model 3, it seems that not using covariates biases this
estimate downwards. The interpretation of this estimate is that on average, an
industry that was not in a cartel last year has a 20% chance of being able to
form a cartel this year.
In contrast, the estimated probability of the ICC holding (Hit) is on average
very high, more than 0.9. The implication of this is that when cartels are legal,
i) industries form a cartel with a very high probability if they get the chance
and ii) that cartels, once formed, are very durable.
[Table 6 - H and κ]
[Figure 6 - Development of H and κ]
These predicted probabilities are allowed to vary over time in Models 2 and
3. In Figure 6 we show the development of predicted Hit and κit for Model 3
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(using data from all industries, and estimated τn). The predicted probability of
continuation is high and very stable with a weak positive trend. This trend is
due to the trend in GDP. The opportunity probability (κit) varies more and also
exhibits a positive trend which is stronger than that for Hit. The large increases
in 1972-75 and 1989 are due to the large positive shocks in the aggregate demand
in these periods (see GDP − pos in Figure 5). Notice that κit is increasing
trend-like, so even ignoring the effect of the positive GDP shocks, its value is
significantly higher at the end of our sample period than at the beginning of
it.23
These results suggest that the degree of cartelization may have increased
over our sample period. We use the HMM structure of our model to illustrate
this in two ways. First, using the local decoding method (see section 2.2.4 and
Appendix C), we can analyze the hidden states and estimate the proportion of
manufacturing industries that had a cartel in a given year. Second, we utilize the
parameters of the hidden part of our model to perform a counterfactual analysis
of the importance of the positive GDP shocks to the degree of cartelization.
The results of the local decoding exercise are displayed in Figure 7. The
proportion of cartelized industries starts reasonably low at round 20%, reflecting
the low value of κit in the early years. It then starts to increase, and jumps
upwards in the early 1970s when κit increases both because it trends upwards,
and because of the large positive GDP shock. We have one possible explanation
for why the jump takes place in the early 1970s. Interestingly, the jump does
coincide almost perfectly with the first oil crises, which also hit the open Finnish
economy and many of its export oriented sectors. However, the export shock
was positive as barter trade with the Soviet Union was important to many
industries in Finland. Finland imported large amounts of oil, and exported
mainly manufacturing goods to the Soviet Union. The trade between the Soviet
Union and Finland was centrally negotiated and this forced industry managers
to interact more frequently. This behavior would be consistent with the increase
in κit.
23 The development of Hit and κit is very similar when we use data on cartelized industries
only. We overestimate κit somewhat when using data only from cartelized industries: The
mean of κit is 0.254 using data on cartelized industries only, model 3 and estimated initial
probabilities. This is 14% higher than the reported mean.
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[Figure 7 - Estimated proportion of cartelized industries]
While the positive GDP shocks do play an important role, the upward trend
in κit is much more important. This is so because of the high continuation
probability Hit. It means that there was very little outflow from the stock
of cartels. Cartels in almost all those industries that didn’t previously have a
cartel but formed one, did not collapse.24 The relative importance of the trend
in κit and the positive GDP shocks is illustrated in Figure 8, where we display
the expected proportion of industries that have a cartel using both actual and
counterfactual data. The proportion of cartelized industries is calculated by
utilizing the fact that the hidden part of our model (i.e., the initial probability
τn and the parameters of the transition matrix Ait) allows us to recursively
calculate the probability of a cartel existing in a given industry in a given period.
We then average over industries.
We perform two counterfactuals. First, we replace the GDP − pos values of
the years 1972-75 with the average of all other years that had a positive shock.
Second, we additionally replace also the large shock of 1989 with the average.
The shocks of the early 1970s have a large impact in the short run, increasing
the proportion of cartelized industries from 44% in 1971 to 92% in 1975. This
rapid increase is followed by a small decrease. The effect of the very large 1989
GDP shock is small because the share of cartelized industries is already high by
then. Noticeable is however that by end of the 1980s both counterfactual cases
produce the same degree of cartellization as the actual data.
[Figure 8 - Counterfactual]
According to our estimates, over 90% of manufacturing industries were
cartelized by the end of the sample. Inferring this directly from entries to
24 To give an example, let’s use 1970 numbers. In that year, 42% of industries had a
cartel according to our estimates, meaning 98 of our 234 industries. Out of the 136 non-
cartelized industries, 18% formed a cartel, and 93% of these satisfied their ICC, adding 23
cartels (= 136× 0.18× 0.93) to the cartel stock. At the same time, only 7 (= 98× (1− 0.93))
previously established cartels died. Thus, the cartel stock went up from 98 to 114. In 1971, 8
cartels died, but 20 were born, taking the stock to 126. Even with the rather low 1970 value
of κit, the proportion of industries that have a cartel would have increased rather rapidly
because of the high value of Hit.
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and/or exits from the Registry would have been impossible. Even if the wel-
fare losses from these Finnish cartels were lower than the typical estimates in
the literature, our estimate of the prevalence of cartels suggests that at least in
Finland, there are high returns to effective competition policy.
4 Conclusions
The objective of this paper has been twofold: First, to build a model that
allows one to estimate the parameters describing the efficiency of competition
policy. The model uses industry (market) level information on cartels that is
generated through modern competition policy actions and is thus becoming
widely available. Second, to take a variant of the model to data on Finnish
legal nationwide manufacturing cartels from 1951 to 1990 and to provide 1)
estimates of the effects of industry characteristics and macro variables on the
birth and death process of cartels and 2) an estimate of how cartelized Finnish
manufacturing was during that era.
We show how the kind of data typically available on cartels, generated
through competition policy actions, yields a Hidden Markov Model (HMM)
once it is matched with the theoretical cartel model of Harrington and Chang
(2009) and Chang Harrington (2009). HMMs are a well-studied and widely used
class of statistical models that so far have found little use in industrial organi-
zation. The estimation approach is relatively flexible, as it can also be merged
with other dynamic models of cartel behavior and modified to fit varying in-
stitutional environments. We chose the Harrington and Chang model because
it endogenizes cartel births and deaths and incorporates the most important
competition policy tools, namely CA detection and leniency. We specify the
HMM to match the modern competition policy environment, derive the compo-
nents of its likelihood function and discuss how the model could be estimated
structurally, or using a reduced form approach. The former has the benefit that
it allows for a counterfactual analysis of different competition policy regimes.
We take a variant of our HMM to data on Finnish legal cartels from 1951 to
1990. While necessarily uninformative about the effects of modern competition
policy, these data allow us to uncover the (industry-specific) parameters that
govern the hidden process of cartel births and deaths. These estimates yield
information on the prevalence of cartels that we could expect if cartels were
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legal. Thereby, we are able to say something about the necessity of modern
competition policy that i) declares cartels illegal, ii) seeks to detect cartels and
ii) levies fines on detected cartels.
We find that both the probability of forming a cartel, and the probability to
continue an existing cartel are increasing functions of GDP. Positive shocks to
GDP affect the probability of forming a cartel, but not the incentive compatibil-
ity condition for continuing a cartel. Labor productivity has a positive impact
on the probability of forming a cartel and variable costs a negative effect.
When we convert our parameter estimates to probabilities, we find that the
mean probability of getting the chance to form a cartel is round 20%, while the
probability of the ICC condition holding is as high as 90% on average. The
former increases strongly over time while the latter is rather stable during our
sample period. We estimate the proportion of Finnish manufacturing industries
that were cartelized in our sample period and find that by the end of the period,
almost all industries had a cartel. This result suggests that there is a high return
to effective competition policy.
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Appendix A: Finite HMM
To provide a formal definition for a HMM, let us assume that observations are
recorded at equally spaced integer times t = 1, 2, ..., Ti for cross-sectional units
i = 1, ..., N . The observed data for i follow a HMM if the hidden states, {Zit}
Ti
t=1,
follow a Markov chain and if given Zit, observation Oit at time t for unit i is
independent of O1t, ..., Oi,t−1, Oi,t+1, ..., OiTi and Z1t, ..., Zi,t−1, Zi,t+1, ..., ZiTi .
This property means that in a standard HMM, the observations are independent
conditional on the sequence of hidden states.
The general econometric/statistical theory and scope of applications of the
HMMs is broad (see, e.g., Cappé, Moulines and Rydén 2005, Zucchini and
MacDonald 2009 and, for a seminal reference, MacDonald and Zucchini 1997,
on which this section builds), but for the purposes of our analysis, we can fo-
cus on the case in which Zit takes on values from a finite set (state space),
SZ = {s1, s2, ..., sZ¯} , where Z¯ is known. We also assume that Yit is a discrete
(categorical) random variable, taking on values from a finite (observations) set,
SO = {o1, o2, ..., oO¯} , where O¯ is known. We defineOi to be the Ti -dimensional
vector of observations on i and O the
∑N
i=1Ti -dimensional vector of all obser-
vations. The vectors of hidden states, Zi and Z, are defined similarly. Finally,
we let xit denote the K-dimensional vector of covariate values of unit i at t,
with xi = {xi1, ...,xiTi} .
The HMM is fully specified by the initial and transition probabilities of the
hidden Markov chain and by the distribution of Oit, given Zit. For a cross-
sectional unit i, these three stochastic elements can be specified as follows:
First, we specify the probability that unit i is at the unobserved state k ∈ SZ
in the initial period (i.e., Zi1 = k), given its contemporary covariate values.
These initial state probabilities are denoted
τki = P (Zi1 = k |xi1 ) . (12)
Second, we specify the (hidden) transition probabilities. They give the prob-
ability that unit i is at state k ∈ SZ in period t, given that it was at state j ∈ SZ
in period t − 1, and given its contemporary covariate values. These transition
probabilities are
ajkit = P (Zit = k|Zi,t−1 = j,xit). (13)
This formulation shows that we allow the Markov chain to be non-homogenous
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(i.e., the transition probabilities can depend on a time index) and that condi-
tional on xit, the current state depends only on the previous state (the Markov
property).25
The third stochastic element of the HMM are the observation probabilities
(’state-dependent probabilities’). The observation probabilities give the proba-
bility of observing w ∈ SO when the unobserved state is k ∈ SZ at t, i.e.,
bkit(w) = P (Oit = w|Zit = k,xit). (14)
This formulation shows that bkit(w) can depend on covariates and that condi-
tional on xit, the observation at time t depends only on the current hidden state
and is independent of the previous observations (and states).
To derive the likelihood of the HMM, let Θ denote the model parameters,
Di1 the (O¯× 1) vector with elements d
k
i1(w) = τ
k
i b
k
i1(w), Ditthe (O¯× O¯) matrix
with elements djkit (w) = a
jk
it b
k
it(w) for t > 1, and 1 the (O¯ × 1) vector of ones.
As shown in e.g. MacDonald and Zucchini (2009, p. 37), Altman (2007) and
Zucchini, Raubenheimer and MacDonald (2008), the likelihood for the whole
observed data can be written as
L(Θ;o) =
N∏
i=1
{
(Di1)
′
(
Ti∏
t=2
Dit
)
1
}
(15)
where o denotes the data (the realization of O).
Appendix B: Hypothetical Cartel Data
Table B.1 illustrates the type of observed data a cartel researcher might have
access to. For this hypothetical example, we set T = 5 and use the following
notation for the observed states: "Not in a cartel” = n, "In a cartel” = c,
25 If the hidden process is stationary and has a unique stationary distribution, the stationary
probabilities can be used as the initial probabilities. The stationary distribution for the
Markov chain does not necessarily exist if one or more of the covariates are functions of time.
If there is no stationary distribution, an initial distribution for Zi1 can be assumed and the
parameters of this distribution can be treated as nuisance parameters. It may, for example,
be sensible to assume that the initial probabilities do not depend on the covariates and are
the same for all for cross-sectional units.
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"Detected and shut down by the CA” = d, “Leniency” = l and "Unknown /
unobserved” = u.
Table B.1: Hypothetical cartel data
time/industry 1 2 3 4 5 6 ... N
t = 1 u u c c u u ... u
t = 2 u n c c n u ... u
t = 3 u c d c n u ... u
t = 4 d d u l u u ... u
t = 5 u u u u u u ... u
The (hypothetical) data tell us (see column 1), for example, that for industry
1, y1 = (u, u, u, d, u)
′. This industry had a cartel in period t = 4 that was
detected and shut down by the CA during that period. The records provide no
reliable information about its status prior to or after the detection. Industry 2
had a cartel in period t = 4 that was detected and shut down by the authorities
during that period. For this industry, the cartel investigations by the authorities
(and thereby their records) reveal that the cartel had been up and running for
one year prior to its detection, and the court established that no cartel existed
two years before the detection took place. However, the records provide no
realiable information about the status of the industry for period t = 1 or the
post-detection period t = 5. Industry 3 had a cartel in period t = 3 that was
detected and shut down by the authorities during that period. For this industry,
the cartel investigations by the authorities reveal that the cartel had been up
and running for two years prior to its detection. But the sample starts at t = 1,
so this industry enters the data in a cartel. The records allow one to determine
these facts, but provide no realiable information about the status of the industry
for the post-detection periods t = 4 and t = 5.
For industry 4, the data are informative about one usage of the leniency
facility (t = 4). The investigations then revealed that the industry was in a
cartel for three years prior to a member applying for leniency. Industry 5 is an
example of what may be rarely observed in cartel data: This case corresponds
to an industry that was suspected and investigated (and perhaps taken into a
court) for having a cartel over a two-year period. The records (e.g., the court
decision) show, however, that it eventually turned out that the industry had no
cartel.
For the remaining industries (i.e. for i = 6, ...,N in our hypothetical exam-
ple), the (published) records of the CA or courts provide no realiable information
about their status, perhaps because they have never been investigated for hav-
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ing a cartel or perhaps because they were suspected of having one, but the
evidence was too weak to result in a published cartel case. These additional
industries can, however, be included in the data set because we assume (as does
Miller 2009) that the number of the industries in the given sector of the econ-
omy from which the detected cartel cases come can be identified. If nothing else
is available, the number of industries covered by the industrial statistics of the
statistical office can be used to identify N .
Appendix C: State Prediction and Learning
In the established literature on HMMs there are three primary methods that can
be used to analyze the hidden states. They are state prediction, and local and
global decoding. To give a formal description of them, we build on Zucchini and
MacDonald (2009) and introduce some new notation. To this end, let O
(t)
i ≡
(Oi1, Oi2, ..., Oit) denote observation history of industry i from time 1 to t, with
corresponding realization o
(t)
i . Similarly, let O
(t+1,T )
i ≡ (Oi,t+1, ..., OiTi) denote
’future’ from t + 1 to Ti , with corresponding realization o
(t+1,T )
i . We further
define LTi= (Di1)
′
(∏Ti
t=2Dit
)
1. Finally, we need two (1 × Z) vectors, called
the forvard and backward probability vectors. For t = 1, ..., Ti, the former is
defined by
ζi,t ≡ (Di1)
′
(
t∏
s=2
Dis
)
.
This vector has property ζi,t = ζi,t−1Dit and its k
th element, ζi,t(k), is the joint
probability Pr
[
O
(t)
i = o
(t)
i , Zit = k
]
.
The vector of backward probabilities is in turn defined by
i,t´ ≡
(
Ti∏
s=t+1
Dis1
)
.
The jth component of i,t´ is denoted i,t(k) and it is equal to the conditional
probability Pr
[
O
(t,T )
i = o
(t,T )
i |Zit = k
]
. It can be shown that LTi= ζi,ti,t′=
ζi,Ti1.
With this notation at our disposal, we can determine the first quantity of
interest to us. It is state prediction (i.e., the conditional distribution of state
Zit) for some t > Ti and i. Provided that one has a view on which values the
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covariates take on during the future time period of interest (i.e., xi,T+1), this
conditional probability can be computed as
Pr
[
Zi,T+1 = c
∣∣∣O(T )i = o(T )i , xi,T+1 ] = ζi,Tai,Ti+1(c)LTi ,
where we explicitly allow for the depence of the state prediction on the pre-
dicted values of the covariates and where vector ai,Ti+1(c) is the column of Ait,
evaluated at xi,T+1. The elements of this vector correspond to transitions from
Zi,t−1 = n, Zi,t−1 = c, or Zi,t−1 = d to Zit = c. A similar expression can be
derived for the probability that the industry is not in a cartel at Ti + 1.
The second quantity of interest is based on local decoding. For any t ∈
{1, ..., Ti}, the interest is in finding the state that is most likely to have generated
the observed data. For t, this most probable state, k∗t , is
k∗t = argmaxk=1,...,Z¯Pr
[
Zit = k
∣∣∣O(T )i = o(T )i ]
where Pr
[
Zit = k
∣∣∣O(T )i = o(T )i ] = ζi,t(k)i,t(k)/LTi . This expression allows
one to determine, for example, whether it is more likely that industry i was in a
cartel in period t than that it was not for those parts of the observed data that
are uninformative about the status of this particular industry.
The third method is global decoding. It looks for the entire sequence of
states, z
(T )
i , which maximizes
Pr
[
Z
(T )
i = z
(T )
i
∣∣∣O(T )i = o(T )i ]
where Z
(t)
i and z
(t)
i denote state histories. There is a dynamic programming
algorithm, called the Viterbi algorithm, which can be used to find the optimal
sequence for industry i.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Observed transitions
Industries with a registered cartel
nt ct ut Row total
nt−1 207 65 89 361
(57.34) (18.01) (24.65) (100)
ct−1 78 312 184 574
(13.59) (54.36) (32.06) (100)
ut−1 80 186 3050 3316
(2.41) (5.61) (91.98) (100)
Column total 365 563 3323 4251
(8.59) (13.24) (78.17) (100)
All industries
nt ct ut Row total
nt−1 207 65 89 361
(57.3) (18.0) (24.7) (100)
ct−1 78 312 184 574
(13.6) (54.4) (32.1) (100)
ut−1 80 186 7925 8191
(1.0) (2.3) (96.8) (100)
Column total 365 563 8198 9126
(4.0) (6.2) (89.8) (100)
NOTES: reported numbers are # observations and (%) of observations on the row.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variable #Obs Mean S.D. Min. Max.
HP − trend 9360 722.13 308.73 297.34 1317.29
GDP − neg 9360 6.30 9.91 0 38.89
GDP − pos 9360 6.24 11.23 0 42.43
GV P 9216 2809560 3002387 4413.7 1.26E+07
Plants 9216 452.52 376.06 6 1602
Hours/GV P 9216 0.021 0.017 0 0.172
Materialshare 9216 0.573 0.137 0.122 0.919
Death− stock 9360 158.75 172.33 0 581
Death− flow 9360 22.5 16.378 0 72
Birth− stock 9360 423.23 320.76 0 900
Birth− flow 9360 14.53 14.02 0 47
NOTES: The number of observations is lower for industry variables
than others due to missing observations.
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Table 3: Estimation results H
τn = 0.5 Estimated τn
H M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
HP − trend - 0.0010 0.0010*** - 0.0009*** 0.0009***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
GDP − neg - 0.0013 0.001 - 0.0008 0.0010
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043)
GDP − pos - 0.0030 0.0041 - 0.0029 0.0039
(0.0041) (0.0043) (0.0041) (0.0043)
GV P - - -9.83E-09 - - -9.42E-09
(2.18E-08) (2.16E-08)
Plants - - -0.00004 - - -0.00005
(0.00015) (0.00014)
Hours/GV P - - 0.34208 - - 0.16835
(0.51121) (4.22278)
Materialshare - - - - 0.37545
(0.50781)
Constant 1.9919*** 0.9359*** 0.7880** 1.9976*** 0.9995*** 0.8247***
(0.0410) (0.1721) (0.3616) (0.0410) (0.1706) (0.3617)
NOTES: Reported numbers are coefficient and (s.e.). ***, **, and *
denote significance at 1, 5, and 10% level.
Table 4: Estimation results κ
τn = 0.5 Estimated τn
κ M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
HP − trend - 0.0027*** 0.0024*** - 0.0027*** 0.0024***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
GDP − neg - -0.0037 -0.0043 - -0.0043 -0.0049
(0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0055)
GDP − pos - 0.0380*** 0.0371*** - 0.0378*** 0.0372***
(0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0046)
GV P - - 2.49E-08 - - 2.93E-08
(2.8E-08) (2.77E-08)
Plants - - 0.0001 - - 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Hours/GV P - - -8.7053** - - -8.8191**
(3.7926) (3.7169)
Materialshare - - -1.3245*** - - -1.5006***
(0.4404) (0.4291)
Constant -1.3252*** -3.2184*** -2.1980*** -1.3251*** -3.1878*** -2.0843***
(0.0324) (0.1146) (0.3248) (0.0322) (0.1123) (0.3152)
NOTES: Reported numbers are coefficient and (s.e.). ***, **, and *
denote significance at 1, 5, and 10% level.
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Table 5: Estimation results β’s
τn = 0.5 Estimated τn
βc M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Birth− stock -0.0203*** -0.0158*** -0.0159*** -0.0210*** -0.0173*** -0.0175***
(0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0022)
Birth− flow -0.0029*** -0.0036*** -0.0036*** -0.0030*** -0.0037*** -0.0037***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Constant 0.6555*** 1.0631*** 1.0577*** 0.7078*** 1.1675*** 1.1680***
(0.0903) (0.1036) (0.1039) (0.0891) (0.1053) (0.1052)
βn
Death− stock 0.0220*** 0.0182*** 0.0183*** 0.0219*** 0.0182*** 0.0183***
(0.0018) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Death− flow -0.0156** -0.0146** -0.0149** -0.0156** -0.0146** -0.0149**
(0.0080) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0080) (0.0068) (0.0068)
Constant -2.2456*** -2.3557*** -2.3520*** -2.2483*** -2.3575*** -2.3542***
(0.0608) (0.0616) (0.0617) (0.0608) (0.0616) (0.0616)
Φ−1(τn) 0 0 0 1.6538*** 1.6226*** 1.6439***
(0.1419) (0.1421) (0.1424)
LL. -3052.5 -2773.8 -2752.6 -2940.7 -2666.2 -2643.5
Nobs. 9360 9360 9216 9360 9360 9216
LR (M2 vs.
M1)
- 557.48 (6) - - 548.9 (6)
LR (M3 vs.
M2)
- - 42.47 (8) - - 45.36 (8)
LR (τn = 0.5
vs. est’ed. τn)
- - - 223.78 (1) 215.16 (1) 218.04 (1)
NOTES: Reported numbers are coefficient and (s.e.). ***, **, and * denote
significance at 1, 5, and 10% level. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1,
5, and 10% level. LR = likelihood ratio test value, reported numbers test
value and (d.f.).
Table 6: Policy parameters
Parameter τn = 0.5 Estimated τn
M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
H 0.977 0.944 0.943 0.977 0.946 0.946
κ 0.093 0.228 0.224 0.093 0.226 0.222
NOTES: Reported numbers are means of the estimated values.
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Figure 1 The timeline and our definition of cartel status  
1950 1990
tb taa trb tsa td trdtcc
c: cartel alive
n: cartel not alive
u: cartel status unobserved
n                                                                  n n
c           c c c c c
u     u u u u u u u u u
td:  actual cartel death 
trd: cartel registered death
tb:  actual birth, 
taa: cartel actual alive 
trb: registered birth 
tsa: cartel seen still alive
tcc: contract change observed 
  
Figure 2 Kernel density of real and registry cartel survival time (kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 
3.7839) 
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Figure 3 The time variation of states 
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Figure 4 Registry deaths and births over time 
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Figure 5 The development in Finnish GDP, long run HP-trend and deviations from trend  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
19
51
19
52
19
53
19
54
19
55
19
56
19
57
19
58
19
59
19
60
19
61
19
62
19
63
19
64
19
65
19
66
19
67
19
68
19
69
19
70
19
71
19
72
19
73
19
74
19
75
19
76
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
HP-trend Finnish GDP GDP-neg GDP-pos
 
Figure 6 The time variation in H and   
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Figure 7 Local decoding of industry probabilities 1951-1990 
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Figure 8 Counterfactual analysis implementing different GDP shock scenarios 
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